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Abstract. Enhancing the accident tolerance of LWRs became a topic of high interest in many
countries after the accidents at Fukushima-Daiichi. Fuel systems that can tolerate a severe accident
for a longer time period are referred as Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF). Development of a new ATF
fuel system requires evaluation, characterization and prioritization since many concepts have been
investigated during the first development phase. For that reason, evaluation metrics have to be defined,
constraints and attributes of each ATF concept have to be studied and finally rating of concepts
presented. This paper summarizes evaluation metrics for ATF cladding with a focus on VVER reactor
types. Fundamental attributes and evaluation baseline was defined together with illustrative scenarios
of severe accidents for modeling purposes and differences between PWR design and VVER design.
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1. Introduction
After the events at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, en-
hancing the accident tolerance of LWRs became a
topic of high interest in many countries. The goal
of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) development is to de-
velop alternative fuels to further enhance the safety,
competitiveness, and economics of nuclear power. The
world’s leader in ATF development are the U.S., where
in 2012, the Congress directed to DOE to:
• Develop enhanced fuels and cladding for LWRs
to improve safety in the event of accidents in the
reactor or spent fuel pools.
• Emphasize and fund activities aimed at the devel-
opment and near-term qualification of meltdown-
resistant ATF that would enhance the safety of
present and future generations of LWRs.
• Create a plan for development of meltdown-resistant
fuels leading to reactor testing and utilization by
2020.
Other countries (e.g. France, South Korea, China)
have been conducting their own ATF research with
similar goals. Recently, Russia introduced its plan
for ATF development with a focus on VVER reactors.
Activities related to the ATF development are also
coordinated by international organizations as IAEA
or OECD/NEA. The initial effort is focused on appli-
cations in operating LWR reactors (PWR, BWR, and
VVER). The goal set by the U.S. or South Korea is to
insert a lead test assembly (LTA) into a commercial
reactor by 2022. Other countries including Russia
or the Czech Republic have not defined their specific
goals, yet.
This paper summarizes an evaluation methodology,
proposed set of metrics, related tests and illustrative
accident scenarios for the evaluation of VVER ATF
cladding concepts. The metrics are based on the de-
tailed evaluation approach proposed in the [1], with
an emphasis given on the fuel cladding, VVER reac-
tors, and their departures from standard PWR reactor
design. The evaluation methodology will be applied
to assess each ATF cladding concept relative to the
current VVER fuel system and will be described in
details in future technical report.
1.1. ATF Definition
ATF fuels are according to the OECD/NEA [2] defined
as fuels that can tolerate a severe accident in
the reactor core for a considerably longer time
period than the current UO2 – Zr alloy fuel sys-
tem, while maintaining or improving the fuel
performance during normal operations and op-
erational transients.
1.2. Coping Time
Each concept will be evaluated besides other char-
acteristics based on its ability to increase the “cop-
ing time” under severe accident conditions. Where
coping time is according to the OECD/NEA defined
as [2]: the time to significant loss of geometry
such that the fuel can no longer be cooled or
cannot be removed from the reactor. For each
concept, there will be an analysis of failure modes and
effects (FMEA) performed to determine the onset of
particular initiating event that leads to severe acci-
dent. However, the common baseline has to be set
and general illustrative scenarios defined.
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1.3. Development Strategy
The strategy for ATF development includes three
phases:
(1.) Feasibility assessment and down-selection (lab-
oratory experiments; code updates; assessment of
economical, operational, safety, fuel cycle, and en-
vironmental impacts using evaluation metrics).
(2.) Development and qualification (ATF fabrication;
irradiation; safety basis testing; qualification and
licensing).
(3.) Commercialization (technology transfer to indus-
try).
Any new ATF concept must comply with current
safety and performance constraints, fuel cycle impacts
or additional LWR design constraints. Moreover, it’s
attributes should be better in comparison with the
current fuel system to achieve comparable or better
performance in normal and accident conditions. For
that reason, the quantitative metrics have to be de-
veloped and described in details taking into account
also the requirements of utilities, fuel vendors, and
regulatory bodies.
1.3.1. Challenges in Developing ATF
One of the main concerns is a definition of testing
and qualification requirements. Individual attributes
are not equal, which requires concepts prioritization
and determination which attributes to test and what
metrics are needed to evaluate attribute compliance.
If new ATF concept should be accepted by utilities
and vendors, it must be capable of integration into
the current nuclear fuel cycle system (Figure 1). The
challenge is to get the best performance at each step
of nuclear fuel cycle, and to understand how it affects
other parts of the system.
Figure 1. ATF shall not negatively (economically
or technically) impact fuel cycle technologies. For
that reason, integrated evaluation approach has to be
adopted.
2. Attributes of ATF
The attributes for mitigation of fuel failure during se-
vere accidents provide fundamental guidance for ATF
evaluation. It may not be necessary to improve fuel
system in all attributes. Some attributes may pro-
vide substantial enhancement in accident tolerance,
while others may provide only marginal benefits. The
desired attributes highlight the performance of the
fuel under normal and accident conditions. Key at-
tributes for a fuel system demonstrating enhanced
accident tolerance include reduced steam reaction ki-
netics, lower hydrogen generation rate, and reduction
of the initial stored energy in the core. The desired
behaviors should be accomplished while maintaining
or improving cladding thermo-mechanical properties,
fuel-cladding interactions, and fission-product reten-
tion.
In some cases, the described consequences of acci-
dent conditions may be concept-specific (e.g. hydrogen
generation in the current Zr alloy-UO2 fuel system).
Other ATF concepts could present additional effects
not expressed here (e.g. generation of CO in case of
SiC) that must be considered in evaluation of the
proposed system. A brief description of the desired
attributes is provided in this section and summarized
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Major issues that need to be addressed in
establishing accident tolerant fuel attributes.
Candidate fuel systems must first NOT HARM,
which means that the fuels must perform as well as
or better than the current fuel system. Moreover, the
fuel system must additionally provide a comparable
or improved response to AOOs (Anticipational Oper-
ational Occurences), DBAs (Design Basis Accidents)
and BDBAs (Beyond Design Basis Accident).
2.1. Hydrogen Generation Rate
Hydrogen generation in the reactor core can lead to
energetic explosions similar as in Fukushima-Daiichi
accident. Under a high-temperature steam environ-
ment, it is not possible to avoid hydrogen generation
with standard Zr-alloys. Rapid oxidation of cladding
results in free hydrogen generation. This exothermic
reaction increases the cladding temperature, which fur-
ther accelerates free hydrogen generation. A related
issue is the diffusion of free hydrogen into the unoxi-
dized portion of the cladding, resulting in enhanced
embrittlement and potential cladding failure.
The desired alternative is a cladding material that
resists oxidation or reduces the rate of oxidation result-
ing in a slower hydrogen generation rate. Materials
with lower heat of oxidation are important due to the
limitation of temperatures during an accident. Ma-
terials that are less susceptible to hydrogen diffusion
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may address the rapid embrittlement issue typical for
standard Zr alloys.
2.2. Fission Product Retention
Cladding provides an important barrier between fis-
sion products and primary circuit. The potential
release of fission products to the environment has to
be avoided, therefore, retention within the fuel is of
the highest importance. While total retention may
not be possible, higher partial retention would be a
substantial improvement.
The desired improvement is to prevent melting
or dispersion of the fuel by utilization of high-
temperature/strength cladding materials that would
retain cladding integrity beyond the current limita-
tions of Zr-alloy cladding.
2.3. Cladding Reaction with Steam
When cladding is exposed to steam at high temper-
ature, multiple issues need to be considered: high-
temperature steam interaction with Zr-alloy cladding,
an exothermic oxidation reaction, hydrogen genera-
tion, and degeneration of the structural integrity of
the cladding.
ATF materials should demonstrate enhanced tol-
erance to radiation and oxidation under high-
temperature exposure while specifically considering
mechanical strength and structural integrity at the
end of life and when exposed to high-temperature
steam for an extended duration.
2.4. Fuel-Cladding Interactions
Pellet cladding chemical interactions (PCCI), pellet
cladding mechanical interactions (PCMI) and fuel
heating are important properties that must be under-
stood during normal operation and accident conditions
for all new fuel concepts.
The desired design option is to develop fuels with
reduced PCCI and PCMI, with lower operating tem-
peratures relative to the Zr alloy-UO2 system, with
higher melting point, and with structural integrity at
high temperatures. Chemical and physical compati-
bility of cladding and fuel for all proposed concepts
must be ensured.
3. Constraints on Development
of Enhanced ATF
Except for a few rare events, the current UO2-Zr fuel
system meets all performance and safety requirements
while keeping nuclear energy economically competi-
tive. Any new ATF concept should be compliant with
and evaluated against current design, operational, eco-
nomic, and safety requirements. Fuel cycle considera-
tions must also be considered, especially for concepts
that represent a significant departure from the cur-
rent technology. A brief summary of the constraints
is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Constraints on New Fuel Designs.
The main constraints include:
• Potential ATF geometry deviations and compatibil-
ity with co-resident fuel.
• Evaluation of all potential accident condition pa-
rameters, including:
. FMEA completion to ensure that any potential
ATF operating vulnerabilities are recognized and
mitigated as possible.
. Completion of a § 50.59-like process (Changes,
tests and experiments section from the 10CFR50
regulation) to illuminate any necessary licensing
or logistical preparations for operation of the
ATF in a commercial LWR. The process and its
guidance is described in [3].
• Quantifying the recommended minimum additional
coping time to be provided by the ATF.
• The need to include a metric to address those con-
cepts that require enrichment greater than 5 wt%.
• The mission of the utility is not to test new fu-
els. Any ATF operation must necessarily address
and minimize impacts on the utility by ensuring
full compatibility with co-resident fuel and reactor
components, and by limiting perturbations of the
normal operation of the plant.
• Nuclear industry has optimized the current Zr-UO2
which represents a large financial investment. The
additional cost of ATF must be relatively low. At
present, it is not feasible to determine quantitative
results.
3.1. Backward Compatibility
ATF concepts must be suitable for use in existing
LWRs. Longer term concepts may be considered in
conjunction with the near-term focus. Proposed fuel
concepts should not require plant modifications to the
current reactors. They should be compatible with
existing fuel handling equipment, fuel rod or assembly
geometry, and co-resident fuel in existing LWRs.
3.2. Impact on Operations
A concept must maintain or extend plant operating
cycles, reactor power output, and reactor control. Re-
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Figure 4. A diagram that describes an approach to
assessing enhanced accident attributes of a proposed
fuel design.
ducing the availability or power output would be un-
acceptable to utilities. To maintain current opera-
tion, some of the fuel system concepts would require
higher fuel enrichment. While the impact of higher
enrichment is fairly well understood from a technical
perspective, regulatory and safeguard issues have to
be addressed.
3.3. Economic Impacts
Any ATF concept is likely to be more expensive than
the current UO2-Zr system, at least initially. Fuels
that require higher enrichment are especially likely
to cost more. Increased enrichment could addition-
ally require modifications to fuel fabrication facilities.
Therefore, it is important to carefully assess the eco-
nomic impact of the new technology and to determine
how much additional fuel cost the utilities will accept.
On the other hand, increasing burnup and power den-
sities (power upgrades) could reduce or mitigate the
negative economical impacts.
3.4. Safety Impact
Performance of a new fuel system will be compared
to the performance of the UO2-Zr alloy system which
defines a baseline for the ATF evaluation. The perfor-
mance must be shown to be similar to or better than
of the current system.
3.5. Fuel Cycle Impact
ATF must adhere to regulations and policies, for both
the fuel fabrication facility and the operating plant,
with respect to technical, regulatory, equipment, and
fuel performance considerations. A new ATF system
could also have an impact on the back-end of the fuel
cycle. The storage, repository performance of the fuel
or possibility of reprocessing must not be degraded.
4. Metrics and Related Testing
The metrics determine a clear technical methodol-
ogy for evaluation that can be used to rank two or
more concepts. The approach has to be simplified
due to the complex multiphysics behavior of nuclear
fuel and the large set of performance requirements
that must be met. Dozens types of ATF cladding
ranging from metallic to fully ceramic cladding each
with very different material properties and behavior
has been studied. Each concept has to be evaluated
and compared to determine the concept viability, and
prioritize resources to obtain the cladding with the
best compromise in terms of properties and behavior
in both nominal and accidental conditions.
4.1. Desired cladding properties,
behavior and performance
The cladding of a nuclear fuel has three fundamental
functions:
(1.) Confinement of fissile material and fission prod-
ucts within the fuel rod.
(2.) Not affecting chain reaction (low absorption cross
section).
(3.) Efficient heat transfer from the fuel to the coolant.
To fulfill these three functions a new ideal cladding
material needs to have certain properties and exhibit
specific behaviors as follows:
Fabricability:
• Compatibility with fabrication facilities; Material
availability; Welding/sealing behavior.
Thermo-mechanical behavior:
• High thermal conductivity, strength, and ductility;
Leak-tightness throughout plant operation (imper-
meable to fission gas and fission products).
Corrosion behavior:
• High corrosion resistance in VVER reactor environ-
ment; High corrosion resistance in high temperature
steam; Low H2 production and low hydrogen em-
brittlement.
Chemical compatibility:
• Compatibility with fuel, coolant, and the fuel as-
sembly components; No eutectic.
Irradiation behavior:
• Stable or predictable thermal, mechanical, and cor-
rosion behavior under irradiation; Dimensional sta-
bility; Low irradiation embrittlement; Low thermal
neutron absorption cross-section; Low activation.
Back-end behavior:
• Low tritium permeation; No impact on the repro-
cessing; Satisfactory storage behavior.
New ATF cladding material will not exhibit all pre-
sented ideal properties. For that reason, a baseline
for evaluation and assessment of various concepts has
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to be established. This corresponds to the metrics
described further.
4.2. Metrics Definition
The metrics are divided into three sections:
(1.) Material properties inherent to the material.
(2.) Material behavior observed through standardized
tests or experiments for normal and accident condi-
tions.
(3.) Material behavior observed through standardized
tests for accident conditions.
Note that, material behavior can depend also on par-
ticular reactor type and its performance.
4.2.1. Inherent Material Properties
The inherent material properties that should be com-
pared are mainly thermal and neutronic properties:
High Melting/Sublimation temperature; High ther-
mal conductivity; Optimal heat capacity/enthalpy;
Optimal thermal expansion coefficient to ensure di-
mensional stability; Thermal neutron absorption cross-
section.
There are other concept-specific inherent properties.
For example in case of multi-layer coating, compati-
bility between different materials has to be ensured.
Additionally, eutectic temperature might decrease the
melting temperature of the cladding so it should be
avoided.
4.2.2. Normal Operation Behavior
In contrast with the inherent physical properties de-
scribed above, the behavior of the materials has to be
assessed through tests with standardized conditions to
enable direct comparison and evaluation of the various
concepts.
Long-term corrosion tests are proposed to eval-
uate the corrosion behavior in normal operating condi-
tions in a different chemical environment. An accelera-
tion of kinetics is likely under irradiation which has to
be also investigated. The important data to assess are:
Visual inspection – Potential delamination of coatings;
Corrosion kinetics – Weight change, Oxide thickness;
Water chemistry analyzes; Hydrogen pick-up.
Mechanical tests suggested for mechanical be-
havior evaluation are: Tensile tests; Internal pres-
sure creep tests; Internal pressure burst tests; Leak-
tightness behavior; Fatigue tests – Thermal cycling,
Internal pressure load cycling.
4.2.3. Accident Conditions Behavior
First, tests simulating normal operating conditions
will be performed. Later, the material performance
under selected accident conditions will be assessed.
Specific tests selected to determine accident perfor-
mance of candidate cladding materials are series of
standard tests simulating RIA and LOCA conditions.
For example: High temperature oxidation, Isother-
mal internal pressure burst tests at multiple tempera-
ture set points, Dynamic internal pressure burst tests
with increasing temperature until cladding failure,
Rapid burst test with increasing temperature until
cladding failure, Tensile tests at elevated temperature,
internal burst tests, tensile test at elevated tempera-
ture etc.
5. Evaluation Baseline
At the beginning of the evaluation, it is recommended
to establish a common understanding of the current
state-of-the-art cladding. Key characteristics and per-
formance criteria were identified, with quantitative
values assigned where possible. All of the parameters
are Zr alloy specific, some are reactor design and re-
actor performance (chemistry regime, power changes)
specific. However, there can be common baseline for
most of LWRs defined with only small uncertainties.
5.1. Baseline for Normal Operating
Conditions
Generally accepted characteristics of Zr-based alloys
during normal operations are [4]:
• Fission product retention: 10−6 pin failure rate,
Radiation tolerant: up to 10 dpa, 1022 n/cm2 fast
(>1MeV), Dimensional stability: max 1% axial
elongation.
• Thermal conductivity λ: ∼17.4W/mK, Heat ca-
pacity Cp: 293 J/kgK, Heat transfer coefficients:
coolant/cladding coupling (reactor design depen-
dent).
• Corrosion performance: Oxide growth ≤100 µm,
Hydrogen content ≤800wppm, Maximum limit on
corrosion product buildup (linked to water chem-
istry specifications), Galvanic corrosion limits, Re-
quirement for all corrosion products to be harmless
to other system components.
• Tritium release into coolant: Limit for tritium per-
meation not established, but “low” permeation is de-
sirable, <10% of the total tritium generated perme-
ating into the coolant could be reasonable. Vendors
assume that less than 2% of this tritium perme-
ates through Zr-based alloy cladding to the coolant
(e.g. for SS-316, the permeation could be as high as
90%).
• Hydrogen pick-up: Typical for Zr-based alloys, De-
pends on corrosion level and varies with alloy from
100 ppm to 800 ppm (600 ppm should be acceptable
under normal operating conditions).
• Mechanical criteria – Ductility: Currently 1% min-
imum of total elongation; modern alloys show uni-
form elongation up to 5% and total elongation up
to 20%; Yield strength: current as-fabricated alloys,
∼150–400MPa at 340 ◦C, Ultimate tensile strength:
437MPa at room temperature (Zry-4), Creep strain
limit: 0.66% (Zry-4); Resistance to crack propaga-
tion (fracture toughness).
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• Fretting wear: <10% of wall thickness; Debris wear
resistance; Fabricable: weldable, thin-walled tube
that maintains hermeticity.
• PCI interaction behavior: Includes consideration of
fission product interactions (possible SCC), Oxide
layer on the inside of the clad (∼10micron).
• Burnup limit: peak rod average: 62MWd/kgU.
5.2. Baseline for Accident Conditions
The accident performance of Zr-based cladding differs
from the normal operation behavior. The main cur-
rent metric for fuel system performance is that the
cladding should maintain post-quench ductility by lim-
iting the peak cladding temperature to 1204 ◦C and
the maximum oxidation level to 17% of the cladding
wall thickness. It has been shown that the temperature
and oxidation limits result in maintaining ductility for
as-fabricated and very low burnup cladding. Changes
underway NRC Regulatory Guides and IAEA guide-
lines will limit the oxidation level for DBAs based
on pre-DBA hydrogen content (e.g. 4% for 600wppm
hydrogen content) [5].
Under beyond BDBA LOCA conditions, cladding
will be subjected to higher temperatures and oxida-
tion levels. Zr-based cladding alloys would experience
longer times at increasing temperatures, higher oxida-
tion rates, higher hydrogen release rates, and higher
internal heat-of-oxidation rates. Key performance
measures for fuel behavior during accident conditions
include coping time, behavior under elevated tempera-
ture conditions over long periods of time, and material
oxidation [6]. The relevant temperatures for LWR se-
vere accidents which result in the formation of liquid
phases due to melting or chemical interactions are
summarized in Figure 5.
• Coping time under DBA and BDBA – LBLOCA
conditions: from 50 to 300 sec at 1204 ◦C, SBLOCA
conditions: ∼1 hr at ≤1050 ◦C.
• Elevated temperature issues – Melting tempera-
ture: ∼1760 ◦C, Temperature for eutectic forma-
tion (decrease of melting point, effects on other
components), Runaway oxidation – relates to heat
of oxidation and acceleration of the oxidation pro-
cess.
• Steam oxidation kinetics: Oxidation rate and asso-
ciated heat of oxidation, Performance considered
for time at elevated temperature and maximum
temperature, Breakaway oxidation may occur at
elevated temperature (e.g. time at ∼1000 ◦C before
breakaway oxidation occurs should be defined).
• Hydrogen production and release: <1% Zr-metal
conversion.
• Maintain ductility following DBA: Most important
accident performance criterion under licensing stan-
dards, Regulation specifies at least 1% ductility
post-quench.
• High temperature mechanical properties: Balloon
and burst are not currently defined as a fuel failure
and are not limited in the licensing criteria; While
only a fraction of rods burst, those that do typi-
cally burst at ∼800 ◦C; Burst may occur at lower
temperature with higher burnup due to higher in-
ternal pressure; Burst is a ductile failure; Size of
ballooning and burst opening can be important to
the results of the failure.
• Severing and/or shattering the cladding with subse-
quent fuel release are considered as a failure; Creep
performance must be also considered.
• Flow blockage under accident scenarios: Required
calculation for licensing, Related to maintaining
coolable geometry, Flow blockage may result from
swelling / ballooning of cladding.
• Thermal shock resistance: Current cladding alloys
do not shatter until they have reached high oxida-
tion levels (>17% of the cladding wall thickness
consumed by oxidation), Standard test applied to
determine thermal shock performance.
Figure 5. LWR severe accident-relevant melting and
chemical interaction temperatures which result in the
formation of liquid phases [7].
The goals of evaluation are associated with defining
requirements for down-selection among options during
the feasibility assessment. It includes identification
of important attributes for ATF, understanding the
common baseline for evaluation and map the merit of
the attributes against potential operational or safety
envelope benefits which are presented in the previous
sections. It is also required to define safety analyzes
including accident scenarios to quantify the target
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values of particular ATF fuel characteristics which are
presented in the next section.
6. Illustrative Scenarios for ATF
Evaluation
Two “bounding scenarios” for BDBA evaluation are
proposed. They cover wide range of severe accidents
and at the same time are not too prescriptive and
specific to a particular NPP design. Modeling of these
scenarios will utilize one of the initiating events and
will continue until a defined point of failure as defined
in by the coping time definition (see Section 1.2) for
particular ATF concept.
The two scenarios applicable to VVER reactors are:
• Long-term Station Blackout: high-pressure scenario;
it will be calculated to the point of reactor pressure
vessel failure.
• Large-break LOCA: low-pressure scenario with high
decay power and limited availability of emergency
cooling systems.
The proposed scenarios are intended to provide
bounding cases for fuel performance. Each ATF con-
cept will be evaluated by fuel performance and system
analysis codes in regard to the two illustrative scenar-
ios. All ATF evaluations should be allowed to progress
to the point defined by the coping time definition with
considering failure modes and effects for particular
ATF concept. The goal of the evaluation is to estimate
the potential increase in coping time that is offered by
the ATF concept and to assess potential outcomes (e.g.
fuel failure, coolability, cause of failure). Following
completion of bounding (most severe) analyzes, more
detailed studies for these illustrative scenarios should
be performed to develop a better understanding of the
impact of additional variables as burnup, time after
SCRAM when core cooling is lost etc.
6.1. High Pressure Scenario – SBO
The high-pressure SBO (Station Blackout) scenario
for ATF evaluation purposes for VVER-1200 reactor
is defined as:
• Loss of all sources of AC supply.
• Feed water supply is unavailable.
• Turbine isolation valve is activated, pressure in the
steam generators (SGs) increases.
• After exceeding the pressure limit the quick-acting
pressure reducing system opens.
• A failure of the quick-acting pressure reducing sys-
tem is postulated – system stays open after pressure
decreases.
• Loss of coolant in SGs leads to decay heat removal
passive system failure.
6.2. Low Pressure Scenario – LBLOCA
+ SBO
The low-pressure scenario for ATF evaluation purposes
for VVER reactors is defined as:
• Guillotine rupture of the primary circuit’s cold leg
near the reactor inlet with SBO.
• Decay heat removal passive system (DHRS) and
emergency core cooling system are in operation.
Operation of the Hydro accumulators is assumed. The
decay heat removal passive system and emergency core
cooling system operate according to their design char-
acteristics: ECCS – up to water volume exhaustion,
DHRS – up to the end of nitrogen absorption due
to ECCS operation. Total operation time of these
systems is approximately 24 h from the accident start.
7. VVER Fuel Specifics
The Russian design pressurized water reactors called
VVER have specific differences in comparison with
western PWRs. It is recommended to adopt all evalua-
tion metrics with both illustrative scenarios presented
above and define additional VVER specific metrics.
The main differences of the VVER fuel and primary
circuit include:
• different water chemistry,
• hexagonal geometry and arrangement of the fuel
assemblies,
• various cladding and fuel materials
. E110 alloy, E635 alloy,
. annular pellet, different dopants, only Gd-based
burnable absorbers,
• assembly shroud – in case of VVER-440 fuel assem-
blies,
• different control rod materials.
The main difference between VVERs and PWRs
can be observed in nominal operation due to different
chemistry of primary circuit and different material
composition. While PWRs use LiOH for chemistry
control, VVERs use KOH. This difference in chem-
istry regime leads to slightly different test conditions
for normal operation corrosion tests. However, in acci-
dent conditions the performance of VVERs is similar
to that of PWRs. Therefore it is not necessary to
define additional VVER-specific metrics for accident
conditions.
8. Conclusion
To develop new accident tolerant fuel systems an eval-
uation and prioritization of ATF concepts has to be
performed at the end of the first development phase.
The prioritization will allow researchers and decision
makers to focus resources on most promising concepts.
Due to the complicated complex multiphysics behav-
ior of nuclear fuel it is not possible to test all the
required characteristics for each concept. For that
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reason, evaluation metrics have to be defined. A good
starting point for ATF evaluation establishment is a
common understanding of the current state-of-the-art
Zr-cladding and its performance in BDBA conditions.
It is a baseline for evaluation and assessment of various
concepts.
Evaluation of ATF cladding must consider the com-
plete fuel system (including fuel cycle) and should
encompass all performance regimes for the fuel, in-
cluding: Fabrication, Normal operation and AOOs,
DBAs, BDBAs, and Used fuel storage, transporta-
tion, and disposition. There are numerous attributes
within each regime that must be considered in evalu-
ating the fuel system performance. Key attributes for
the cladding were discussed in Sections 4 and 5, along
with a summary of standard tests recommended for
measuring specific properties and characterizing per-
formance under the specified conditions. It may not
be possible to improve the current state-of-the-art fuel
system in all attributes and regimes, significant im-
provement in some of the key attributes may outweigh
modest performance gains or modest vulnerabilities
in other attributes.
A detailed list of proposed attributes for evaluation
is provided together with metrics and standardized
tests. The attributes summarized in this document,
can be used as a qualitative guide to assess the perfor-
mance of candidate materials relative to the current
state-of-the-art materials and relative to one another.
Evaluation baseline for common understanding of the
current cladding was presented. To further determine
the common understanding of ATF performance two
severe accidents were defined and described. Based
on the illustrative scenarios the coping time can be
calculated and ATF concepts evaluated. Most of the
metrics and attributes are generally applicable for
all LWR reactors but some attributes as chemistry
regime are reactor-specific and for that reason addi-
tional metrics and standardized test were defined for
VVER types of reactors. Detailed more prescriptive
approach for evaluation of ATF cladding for VVERs
will be described in future technical report.
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